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ABSTRACT
Prior AI breakthroughs in complex games have focused on either the purely adver-
sarial or purely cooperative settings. In contrast, Diplomacy is a game of shifting
alliances that involves both cooperation and competition. For this reason, Diplo-
macy has proven to be a formidable research challenge. In this paper we describe
an agent for the no-press variant of Diplomacy that combines supervised learning
on human data with one-step lookahead search via external regret minimization.
External regret minimization techniques have been behind previous AI successes
in adversarial games, most notably poker, but have not previously been shown
to be successful in large-scale games involving cooperation. We show that our
agent greatly exceeds the performance of past no-press Diplomacy bots, is unex-
ploitable by expert humans, and achieves a rank of 23 out of 1,128 human players
when playing anonymous games on a popular Diplomacy website.
1 INTRODUCTION
A primary goal for AI research is to develop agents that can act optimally in real-world multi-agent
interactions (i.e., games). In recent years, AI agents have achieved expert-level or even superhuman
performance in benchmark games such as backgammon (Tesauro, 1994), chess (Campbell et al.,
2002), Go (Silver et al., 2016; 2017; 2018), poker (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown & Sandholm,
2017; 2019b), and real-time strategy games (Berner et al., 2019; Vinyals et al., 2019). However,
previous large-scale game AI results have focused on either purely competitive or purely cooperative
settings. In contrast, real-world games, such as business negotiations, politics, and traffic navigation,
involve a far more complex mixture of cooperation and competition. In such settings, the theoretical
grounding for the techniques used in previous AI breakthroughs falls apart.
In this paper we augment neural policies trained through imitation learning with regret minimization
search techniques, and evaluate on the benchmark game of no-press Diplomacy. Diplomacy is a
longstanding benchmark for research that features a rich mixture of cooperation and competition.
Like previous researchers, we evaluate on the widely played no-press variant of Diplomacy, in which
communication can only occur through the actions in the game (i.e., no cheap talk is allowed).
Specifically, we begin with a blueprint policy that approximates human play in a dataset of Diplo-
macy games. We then improve upon the blueprint during play by approximating an equilibrium for
the current phase of the game, assuming all players (including our agent) play the blueprint for the
remainder of the game. Our agent then plays its part of the computed equilibrium. The equilibrium
is computed via external regret matching (ERM) (Blackwell et al., 1956; Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000).
Search via ERM has led to remarkable success in poker. However, ERM only converges to a Nash
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and other special cases, and ERM was never previously
shown to produce strong policies in a mixed cooperative/competitive game as complex as no-press
Diplomacy. Nevertheless, we show that our agent exceeds the performance of prior agents and for
the first time convincingly surpasses human-level performance in no-press Diplomacy. Specifically,
we show that our agent soundly defeats previous agents, that our agent is far less exploitable than
previous agents, that an expert human cannot exploit our agent even in repeated play, and, most
importantly, that our agent achieves a score of 25.6% when playing anonymously with humans on a
popular Diplomacy website, compared to an average human score of 14.3%.
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Search has previously been used in almost every major game AI breakthrough, including backgam-
mon (Tesauro, 1994), chess (Campbell et al., 2002), Go (Silver et al., 2016; 2017; 2018),
poker (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2017; 2019b), and Hanabi (Lerer et al., 2020).
A major exception is real-time strategy games (Vinyals et al., 2019; Berner et al., 2019). Similar to
SPARTA as used in Hanabi (Lerer et al., 2020), our agent conducts one-ply lookahead search (i.e.,
changes the policy just for the current game turn) and thereafter assumes all players play according
to the blueprint. Similar to the Pluribus poker agent (Brown & Sandholm, 2019b), our search tech-
nique uses external regret matching to compute an approximate equilibrium. In a manner similar to
the sampled best response algorithm of Anthony et al. (2020), we sample a limited number of actions
from the blueprint policy rather than search over all possible actions, which would be intractable.
Learning effective policies in games involving cooperation and competition has been studied exten-
sively in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) (Shoham et al., 2003). Nash-Q
and CE-Q applied Q learning for general sum games by using Q values derived by computing Nash
(or correlated) equilibrium values at the target states (Hu & Wellman, 2003; Greenwald et al., 2003).
Friend-or-foe Q learning treats other agents as either cooperative or adversarial, where the Nash Q
values are well defined Littman (2001). The recent focus on "Deep" MARL has led to learning rules
from game theory such as fictitious play and regret minimization being adapted to Deep reinforce-
ment learning (Heinrich & Silver, 2016; Brown et al., 2019), as well as work on game-theoretic
challenges of mixed cooperative/competitive settings such as social dilemmas and multiple equilib-
ria in the MARL setting (Leibo et al., 2017; Lerer & Peysakhovich, 2017; 2019).
Diplomacy in particular has served for decades as a benchmark for multi-agent AI research (Kraus
& Lehmann, 1988; Kraus et al., 1994; Kraus & Lehmann, 1995; Johansson & Håård, 2005; Ferreira
et al., 2015). Recently, Paquette et al. (2019) applied imitation learning (IL) via deep neural networks
on a dataset of more than 150,000 Diplomacy games. This work greatly improved the state of the art
for no-press Diplomacy, which was previously a handcrafted agent (van Hal, 2013). Paquette et al.
(2019) also tested reinforcement learning (RL) in no-press Diplomacy via Advantage Actor-Critic
(A2C) (Mnih et al., 2016). Anthony et al. (2020) introduced sampled best response policy iteration,
a self-play technique, which further improved upon the performance of Paquette et al. (2019).
2.1 DESCRIPTION OF DIPLOMACY
The rules of no-press Diplomacy are complex; a full description is provided by Paquette et al. (2019).
No-press Diplomacy is a seven-player zero-sum board game in which a map of Europe is divided
into 75 provinces. 34 of these provinces contain supply centers (SCs), and the goal of the game is
for a player to control a majority (18) of the SCs. Each players begins the game controlling three or
four SCs and an equal number of units.
The game consists of three types of phases: movement phases in which each player assigns an order
to each unit they control, retreat phases in which defeated units retreat to a neighboring province,
and adjustment phases in which new units are built or existing units are destroyed.
During a movement phase, a player assigns an order to each unit they control. A unit’s order may be
to hold (defend its province), move to a neighboring province, convoy a unit over water, or support
a neighboring unit’s hold or move order. Support may be provided to units of any player. We refer
to a tuple of orders, one order for each of a player’s units, as an action. That is, each player chooses
one action each turn. There are an average of 26 valid orders for each unit (Paquette et al., 2019), so
the game’s branching factor is massive and on some turns enumerating all actions is intractable.
Importantly, all actions occur simultaneously. In live games, players write down their orders and
then reveal them at the same time. This makes the game an imperfect-information game in which an
optimal policy may need to be stochastic in order to prevent predictability.
Diplomacy is designed in such a way that cooperation with other players is almost essential in order
to achieve victory, even though only one player can ultimately win.
A game may end in a draw on any turn if all remaining players agree. Draws are a common outcome
among experienced players because players will often coordinate to prevent any individual from
reaching 18 centers. The two most common scoring systems for draws are draw-size scoring (DSS),
in which all surviving players equally split a win, and sum-of-squares scoring (SoS), in which
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player i receives a score of C
2
i∑
j∈N C
2
j
, where Ci is the number of SCs that player i controls (Fogel,
2020). Throughout this paper we use SoS scoring except in anonymous games against humans
where the human host chooses a scoring system.
2.2 EXTERNAL REGRET MATCHING
External Regret Matching (ERM) (Blackwell et al., 1956; Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000) is an iterative
algorithm that converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) (Nash, 1951) in two-player zero-sum games
and other special cases, and converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) (Hannan, 1957) in
general.
We consider a game with N players where each player i chooses an action ai from a set of actions
Ai. We denote the joint action as a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ), the actions of all players other than i as
a−i, and the set of joint actions as A. After all players simultaneously choose an action, player i
receives a reward of vi(a) (which can also be represented as vi(ai, a−i). Players may also choose
a probability distribution over actions, where the probability of action ai is denoted pii(ai) and the
vector of probabilities is denoted pii.
Normally, each iteration of ERM has a computational complexity of Πi∈N |Ai|. In a seven-player
game, this is typically intractable. We therefore use a sampled form of ERM in which each iteration
has a computational complexity of
∑
i∈N |Ai|. We now describe this sampled form of ERM.
Each agent imaintains an external regret value for each action ai ∈ Ai, which we refer to simply as
regret. The regret on iteration t is denoted Rti(ai). Initially, all regrets are zero. On each iteration t
of ERM, piti(ai) is set according to
piti(ai) =
{
max{0,Rti(ai)}∑
a′∈Ai max{0,R
t
i(a
′
i)} if
∑
a′i∈Ai max{0, R
t
i(a
′
i)} > 0
1
|Ai| otherwise
(1)
Next, each player samples an action a∗i fromAi according to piti and all regrets are updated such that
Rt+1i (ai) = R
t
i(ai) + vi(ai, a
∗
−i)−
∑
a′i∈Ai
piti(a
′
i)vi(a
′
i, a
∗
−i) (2)
ERM guarantees that Rti(ai) ∈ O(
√
t). If Rti(ai) grows sublinearly for all players’ actions, as in
ERM, then the average policy over all iterations converges to a NE in two-player zero-sum games
and in general the empirical distribution of players’ joint policies converges to a CCE as t→∞.
In order to improve empirical performance, we use linear ERM (Brown & Sandholm, 2019a), which
weighs updates on iteration t by t.1 We also use optimism (Syrgkanis et al., 2015), in which the
most recent iteration is counted twice when computing regret. Additionally, the action our agent
ultimately plays is sampled from the final iteration’s policy, rather than the average policy over all
iterations. This reduces the risk of sampling a non-equilibrium action due to insufficient conver-
gence. In theory sampling from the final iteration may increase exploitability, but this technique has
been used successfully in past poker agents (Brown & Sandholm, 2019b).
3 AGENT DESCRIPTION
Our agent is composed of two major components. The first is a blueprint policy and state-value
function trained via imitation learning on human data. The second is a search algorithm that utilizes
the blueprint. This algorithm is executed on every turn, and approximates an equilibrium policy (for
all players, not just the agent) for the current turn via ERM, assuming that the blueprint is played by
all players for the remaining game beyond the current turn.
3.1 SUPERVISED LEARNING
We construct a blueprint policy via imitation learning on a corpus of 46,148 Diplomacy games col-
lected from online play, building on the methodology and model architecture described by Paquette
1In practice, rather than weigh iteration t’s updates by t we instead discount prior iterations by t
t+1
in order
to reduce numerical instability. The two options are mathematically equivalent.
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et al. (2019) and Anthony et al. (2020). A blueprint policy and value function estimated from hu-
man play is ideal for performing search in a general-sum game, because it is likely to realistically
approximate state values and other players’ actions when playing with humans. Our blueprint su-
pervised model is based on the DipNet agent from Paquette et al. (2019), but we make a number of
modifications to the architecture and training.
We trained the blueprint policy using only a subset of the data used by Paquette et al. (2019), specif-
ically those games obtained from webdiplomacy.net. For this subset of the data, we obtained
metadata about the press variant (full-press vs. no-press) which we add as a feature to the model,
and anonymized player IDs for the participants in each game. Using the IDs, we computed ratings
si for each player i and only trained the policy on actions from players with above-average ratings.
Appendix A describes our method for computing these ratings.
Our model closely follows the architecture of Paquette et al. (2019), with additional dropout of
0.4 between GNN encoder layers. We model sets of build orders as single tokens because there
are a small number of build order combinations and it is tricky to predict sets auto-regressively
with teacher forcing. We adopt the encoder changes of Anthony et al. (2020), but do not adopt
their relational order decoder because it is more expensive to compute and leads to only marginal
accuracy improvements after tuning dropout.
We make a small modification to the encoder GNN architecture that improves modeling. In addition
to the standard residual that skips the entire GNN layer, we replace the graph convolution2 with the
sum of a graph convolution and a linear layer. This allows the model to learn a hierarchy of features
for each graph node (through the linear layer) without requiring a concomitant increase in graph
smoothing (the GraphConv). The resulting GNN layer computes (modification in red)
xi+1 = Dropout(ReLU(BN(GraphConv(xi)+Axi))) + xi. (3)
where A is a learned linear transformation.
Finally, we achieve a substantial improvement in order prediction accuracy using a featurized order
decoder. Diplomacy has over 13,000 possible orders, many of which will be observed infrequently
in the training data. Therefore, by featurizing the orders by the order type, and encodings of the
source, destination, and support locations, we observe improved prediction accuracy.
Specifically, in a standard decoder each order o has a learned representation eo, and for some board
encoding x and learned order embedding eo, P (o) = softmax(x ·eo). With order featurization, we
use e˜o = eo + Afo, where fo are static order features and A is a learned linear transformation. The
order featurization we use is the concatenation of the one-hot order type with the board encodings
for the source, destination, and support locations. We found that representing order location features
by their location encodings works better than one-hot locations, presumably because the model can
learn more state-contextual features.3
We add an additional value head to the model immediately after the dipnet encoder, that is trained
to estimate the final SoS scores given a board situation. The value head is an MLP with one hidden
layer that takes as input the concatenated vector of all board position encodings. A softmax over
powers’ SoS scores is applied at the end to enforce that all players’ SoS scores sum to 1.
3.2 EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH
The policy that is actually played results from a search algorithm which utilizes the blueprint policy.
Let s be the current state of the game. On each turn, the search algorithm computes an equilibrium
for a subgame and our agent plays according to its part of the equilibrium solution for its next action.
Conceptually, the subgame is a well-defined game that begins at state s. The set of actions available
to each player is a subset of the possible actions in state s in the full game, and are referred to as the
2As noted by Anthony et al. (2020), DipNet uses a variant of a GNN that learns a separate weight matrix at
each graph location.
3We note the likelihood that a transformer with token-based decoding should capture a similar featurization,
although Paquette et al. (2019) report worse performance for both a transformer and token-based decoding.
4This is slightly different than reported in Paquette et al. (2019) because we compute token-accuracy treating
a full set of build orders as a single token.
5Policy accuracy for these model are not comparable to above because training data was modified.
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Model Policy Accuracy SoS v. DipNet
T=0.5 T=0.1
DipNet (Paquette et al. (2019)) 60.5%4 0.143
+ combined build orders & encoder dropout 62.0%
+ encoder changes from Anthony et al. (2020) 62.4% 0.150 0.198
switch to webdiplomacy training data only 61.3%5 0.175 0.206
+ output featurization 62.0% 0.184 0.188
+ improved GNN layer 62.4% 0.183 0.205
+ merged GNN trunk 62.9% 0.199 0.202
Table 1: Effect of model and training data changes on supervised model quality. Our final blueprint
model improves modeling accuracy by about 2% and achieves a 1v6 score of 20% against 6 of the
original DipNet model.
Figure 1: Left: Score of SearchBot using different numbers of sampled subgame actionsMi, against 6 DipNet
agents ((Paquette et al., 2019) at temperature 0.1). A score of 14.3% would be a tie. Even when sampling only
two actions, SearchBot dramatically outperforms our blueprint, which achieves a score of 20.2%. Sampling
a single action leads to poor performance due to all-hold actions, which is fixed if these actions are explicitly
excluded. Right: The effect of different rollout lengths on SearchBot performance.
subgame actions. Each player i chooses a subgame action ai, resulting in joint subgame action a.
After a is taken, the players make no further decisions in the subgame. Instead, the players receive
a reward corresponding to the players sampling actions according to the blueprint policy pib for the
remaining game.
The subgame actions for player i are the Mi highest-probability actions according to the blueprint
model. Mi is a hyperparameter that is proportional to the number of units controlled by player i.
The effect of different choices for Mi is plotted in Figure 1 (left).
Rolling out pib to the end of the game is very expensive, so in practice we instead roll out pib for a
small number of turns (usually 2 or 3 movement phases in our experiments) until state s′ is reached,
and then use value for s′ from the blueprint’s value network as the reward vector. Figure 1 (right)
shows the performance of our search agent using different rollout lengths. We do not observe im-
proved performance for rolling out farther than 3 or 4 movement phases.
We compute a policy for each agent by running the sampled regret matching algorithm described
in Equation 1 and Equation 2. The search algorithm typically required between 2 minutes and 20
minutes per turn using a single Volta GPU and 8 CPU cores, depending on the hyperparameters used
for the game. Details on the hyperparameters we used are provided in Appendix F.
4 RESULTS
Using the techniques described in Section 3, we developed an agent we call SearchBot. Our experi-
ments focus on two formats. The first evaluates SearchBot playing against the population of human
players on a popular Diplomacy website. The second measures the exploitability of SearchBot. We
also show head-to-head performance against prior bots in Appendix E.
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4.1 PERFORMANCE AGAINST A POPULATION OF HUMAN PLAYERS
The ultimate test of an AI system is how well it performs in the real world with humans. To measure
this, we had SearchBot anonymously play no-press Diplomacy games on the popular Diplomacy
website webdiplomacy.net. Since there are 7 players in each game, average human perfor-
mance is a score of 14.3%. In contrast, SearchBot scored 25.6% ± 4.8%.6 If the bot’s performance
for each of the 7 powers is weighed equally, this score increases to 27.0% ± 5.3%. The agent’s
performance is shown in Table 2 and a detailed breakdown is presented in Table 5 in the appendix.
In addition to raw score, we measured SearchBot’s performance using the Ghost-Rating sys-
tem (Anthony, 2020), which is a Diplomacy rating system inspired by the Elo system that ac-
counts for the relative strength of opponents and that is used to semi-officially rank players on
webdiplomacy.net. Among no-press Diplomacy players on the site, our agent ranked 23 out
of 1,128 players with a Ghost-Rating of 176.0 as of September 30th, 2020.7
Power Bot Score Human Mean Games Wins Draws Losses
All Games 25.6% ± 4.8% 14.3% 50 7 16 27
Normalized By Power 27.0% ± 5.3% 14.3% 50 7 16 27
Table 2: Performance of our agent in anonymous games against humans on webdiplomacy.net. Average
human performance is 14.3%. Score in the case of draws was determined by the rules of the joined game. The
± shows one standard error. A breakdown of performance per power is provided in Table 5 in Appendix F.
Details on the setup for experiments are provided in Appendix F.
4.2 EXPLOITABILITY
While performance of an agent within a population of human players is the most important metric,
that metric alone does not capture how the population of players might adapt to the agent’s presence.
For example, if our agent is extremely strong then over time other players might adopt the bot’s
playstyle. As the percentage of players playing like the bot increases, other players might adopt a
policy that seeks to exploit this playstyle. Thus, if the bot’s policy is highly exploitable then it might
eventually do poorly even if it initially performs well against the population of human players.
This can partly be interpreted through an evolutionary lens using the notion of an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS) (Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Smith, 1982), which is a refinement of Nash equi-
librium (Nash, 1951). If our agent’s policy is an ESS (or Nash equilibrium), then a population of
players all playing the agent’s policy could not be “invaded” by a different policy. That is, no other
policy could do better than tie against the population’s policy.
Motivated by this, we measure the exploitability of our agent. Exploitability of a policy profile
pi (denoted e(pi)) measures worst-case performance when all but one agents follows pi. Formally,
the exploitability of pi is defined as e(pi) =
∑
i∈N maxpii vi(pii, pi−i)/N , where pi−i denotes the
policies of all players other than i. Agent i’s best response to pi−i is defined as BR(pi−i) =
arg maxpii vi(pii, pi−i).
We estimate our agent’s full-game exploitability in two ways: by training an RL agent to best re-
spond to the bot, and by having expert humans repeatedly play against six copies of the bot. We also
measure the ‘local’ exploitability in the search subgame and show that it converges to an approxi-
mate Nash equilibrium.
4.2.1 PERFORMANCE AGAINST A BEST-RESPONDING AGENT
When the policies of all players but one are fixed, the game becomes a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) (Howard, 1960) for the non-fixed player because the actions of the fixed players can be
viewed as stochastic transitions in the “environment”. Thus, we can estimate the exploitability of
pi by first training a best response policy BR(pi−i) for each agent i using any single-agent RL
algorithm, and then computing
∑
i∈N vi(BR(pi−i), pi−i)/N . Since the best response RL policy
6Most games used draw-size scoring in the case of draws, while our agent was trained based on sum-of-
squares scoring. If all games are scored using sum-of-squares, our agent achieves a score of 30.2% ± 5.3%.
7Our agent played games under different accounts; we report the Ghost-Rating for these accounts merged.
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Figure 2: Score of the exploiting agent against the blueprint and SearchBot-clone as a function of training time.
We report the average of six runs. The shaded area corresponds to three standard errors. We use temperature
0.5 for both agents as it minimizes exploitability for the blueprint. Since SearchBot-clone is trained through
imitation learning of SearchBot, the exploitability of SearchBot is almost certainly lower than SearchBot-clone.
will not be an exact best response (which is intractable to compute in a game as complex as no-press
Diplomacy) this only gives us a lower-bound estimate of the exploitability.
Following other work on environments with huge action spaces (Vinyals et al., 2019; Berner et al.,
2019), we use a distributed asynchronous actor-critic RL approach to optimize the exploiter pol-
icy (Espeholt et al., 2018). We use the same architecture for the exploiter agent as for the fixed
model. Moreover, to simplify the training we initialize the exploiter agent from the fixed model.
We found that training becomes unstable when the policy entropy gets too low. The standard rem-
edy is to use an entropy regularization term. However, due to the immense action space, an exact
computation of the entropy term, Ealog pθ(a), is infeasible. Instead, we optimize a surrogate loss
that gives an unbiased estimate of the gradient of the entropy loss (see Appendix C). We found this
to be critical for the stability of the training.
Training an RL agent to exploit SearchBot is prohibitively expensive. Even when choosing hyper-
parameters that would result in the agent playing as fast as possible, SearchBot typically requires
at least a full minute in order to act each turn. Instead, we collect a dataset of self-play games of
SearchBot and train a supervised agent on this dataset. The resulting agent, which we refer to as
SearchBot-clone, is weaker than SearchBot but requires only a single pass through the neural net-
work in order to act on a turn. By training an agent to exploit SearchBot-clone, we can obtain a
(likely) upper bound on what the performance would be if a similar RL agent were trained against
SearchBot. We report the reward of the exploiter agents against the blueprint and SearchBot-clone
agents in Figure 2.
4.2.2 PERFORMANCE AGAINST EXPERT HUMAN EXPLOITERS
In addition to training a best-responding agent, we also invited the 1st and 2nd place finishers in
the 2017 World Diplomacy Convention (widely considered the world championship for full-press
Diplomacy) to play games against six copies of our agent. The purpose was to determine whether
the human experts could discover exploitable weaknesses in the bot.
The humans played games against three types of bots: DipNet (Paquette et al., 2019) (with tem-
perature set to 0.5), our blueprint agent (with temperature set to 0.5), and SearchBot. In total, the
participants played 35 games against each bot; each of the seven powers was controlled by a human
player five times, while the other six powers were controlled by identical copies of the bot. The
performance of the humans is shown in Table 3. While the sample size is relatively small, the results
suggest that our agent is less exploitable than prior bots.
4.2.3 EXPLOITABILITY IN LOCAL SUBGAME
We first investigate the exploitability of our agent in the local subgame defined by a given board
state, sampled actions, and assumed blueprint policy for the rest of the game. We simulate 7
games between a search agent and 6 DipNet agents, and plot the total exploitability of the av-
erage strategy of the search procedure as a function of the number of ERM iterations, as well
as the exploitability of the blueprint policies. Utilities ui are computed using Monte Carlo roll-
7
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Power 1 Human vs. 6 DipNet 1 Human vs. 6 Blueprint 1 Human vs. 6 SearchBot
All Games 39.1% 22.5% 5.7%
Table 3: Performance of one expert human playing against six bots under repeated play. A score less than
14.3% means the human is unable to exploit the bot. Five games were played for each power for each agent,
for a total of 35 games per agent. For each power, the human first played all games against DipNet, then the
blueprint model described in Section 3.1, and then finally SearchBot.
Figure 3: Left: Distance of the CFR average strategy from equilibrium as a function of the CFR iteration,
computed as the sum of all agents’ exploitability in the matrix game in which CFR is employed. CFR converges
to an approximate equilibrium, while the blueprint policy has only slightly lower exploitability than the uniform
distribution over the 50 sampled CFR actions (i.e. CFR iteration 1). Right: Comparison of convergence of
individual strategies to the average of two independently computed strategies. The similarity of these curves
suggests that independent ERM computations lead to compatible equilibria. Note: Exploitability is averaged
over all phases in 7 simulated games; more detailed results are provided in the Appendix.
outs with the same blueprint as CFR, and total exploitability for a joint policy pi is computed as
e(pi) =
∑
i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, pi−i)− ui(pi). The exploitability curves aggregated over all phases are
shown in Figure 3 (left) and broken down by phase in the Appendix.
In Figure 3 (right), we verify that the average of policies from multiple independent executions
of ERM also converges to an approximate Nash. For example, it is possible that if each agent
independently running ERM converged to a different incompatible equilibrium and played their part
of it, then the joint policy of all the agents would not be an ESS. However we observe that the
exploitibility of the average of policies closely matches the exploitability of the individual policies.
5 CONCLUSIONS
No-press Diplomacy is a complex game involving both cooperation and competition that poses ma-
jor theoretical and practical challenges for past AI techniques. Nevertheless, our AI agent achieves
human-level performance in this game with a combination of supervised learning on human data
and one-ply search using external regret minimization. The massive improvement in performance
from conducting search just one action deep matches a larger trend seen in other games, such as
chess, Go, poker, and Hanabi, in which search dramatically improves performance. While external
regret minimization has been behind previous AI breakthroughs in purely competitive games, it was
never previously shown to be successful in a complex game involving cooperation. The success of
ERM in no-press Diplomacy suggests that its use is not limited to purely adversarial games.
Our work points to several avenues for future research. SearchBot conducts search only for the cur-
rent turn. In principle, this search could extend deeper into the game tree using counterfactual regret
minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2008). However, the size of the subgame grows exponentially
with the depth of the subgame. Developing search techniques that scale more effectively with the
depth of the game tree may lead to substantial improvements in performance. Another direction is
combining our search technique with reinforcement learning. Combining search with reinforcement
learning has led to tremendous success in perfect-information games (Silver et al., 2018) and more
recently in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games as well (Brown et al., 2020). Finally,
it remains to be seen whether similar search techniques can be developed for variants of Diplomacy
that allow for coordination between agents.
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A COMPUTING PLAYER RATINGS IN HUMAN DATA
To compute player ratings, we used a regularized logistic outcome model. Specifically, we optimized
the loss
L(s|D) = E(i,j)∈D [σ(si − sj)] + λ|s|2
across all pairs of players (i, j) ∈ D where player i achieved a "better" outcome than player j in a
game. We found this approach led to more plausible scores than Elo (Elo, 1978) or TrueSkill (Her-
brich et al., 2007) ratings.
Paquette et al. (2019) took an orthogonal approach to filter poor players from the training data:
they only trained on "winning" powers, i.e. those who ended the game with at least 7 SCs. This
filtering is sensible for training a policy for play, but is problematic for training policies for search.
In a general-sum game, it is crucial for the agent to be able to predict the empirical distribution of
actions even for other agents who are destined to lose.
B SEARCH EXAMPLE
The listing below shows the policy generated by one run of our search algorithm for the opening
move of Diplomacy when running for 512 iterations and considering 8 possible actions per power.
For each possible action, the listing below shows
probs : The probability of the action in the final strategy.
bp_p : The probability of the action in the blueprint strategy.
avg_u : The average predicted sum-of-squares utility of this action.
orders : The orders for this action
AUSTRIA avg_utility=0.15622
probs bp_p avg_u orders
0.53648 0.13268 0.15697 (’A VIE - TRI’, ’F TRI - ALB’, ’A BUD - SER’)
0.46092 0.52008 0.14439 (’A VIE - GAL’, ’F TRI - ALB’, ’A BUD - SER’)
0.00122 0.03470 0.14861 (’A VIE - TRI’, ’F TRI - ALB’, ’A BUD - GAL’)
0.00077 0.03031 0.11967 (’A VIE - BUD’, ’F TRI - ALB’, ’A BUD - SER’)
0.00039 0.05173 0.11655 (’A VIE - GAL’, ’F TRI S A VEN’, ’A BUD - SER’)
0.00015 0.04237 0.12087 (’A VIE - GAL’, ’F TRI H’, ’A BUD - SER’)
0.00007 0.14803 0.09867 (’A VIE - GAL’, ’F TRI - VEN’, ’A BUD - SER’)
0.00000 0.04009 0.03997 (’A VIE H’, ’F TRI H’, ’A BUD H’)
ENGLAND avg_utility=0.07112
probs bp_p avg_u orders
0.41978 0.20069 0.07151 (’F EDI - NTH’, ’F LON - ENG’, ’A LVP - YOR’)
0.34925 0.29343 0.07161 (’F EDI - NWG’, ’F LON - NTH’, ’A LVP - YOR’)
0.10536 0.06897 0.07282 (’F EDI - NTH’, ’F LON - ENG’, ’A LVP - WAL’)
0.07133 0.36475 0.07381 (’F EDI - NWG’, ’F LON - NTH’, ’A LVP - EDI’)
0.05174 0.01649 0.07202 (’F EDI - NTH’, ’F LON - ENG’, ’A LVP - EDI’)
0.00249 0.00813 0.06560 (’F EDI - NWG’, ’F LON - NTH’, ’A LVP - WAL’)
0.00006 0.00820 0.06878 (’F EDI - NWG’, ’F LON - ENG’, ’A LVP - EDI’)
0.00000 0.03933 0.03118 (’F EDI H’, ’F LON H’, ’A LVP H’)
FRANCE avg_utility=0.21569
probs bp_p avg_u orders
0.92038 0.09075 0.21772 (’F BRE - MAO’, ’A PAR - GAS’, ’A MAR - BUR’)
0.06968 0.42617 0.18878 (’F BRE - MAO’, ’A PAR - BUR’, ’A MAR S A PAR - BUR’)
0.00917 0.07987 0.16941 (’F BRE - MAO’, ’A PAR - PIC’, ’A MAR - BUR’)
0.00049 0.05616 0.16729 (’F BRE - ENG’, ’A PAR - BUR’, ’A MAR - SPA’)
0.00023 0.17040 0.17665 (’F BRE - MAO’, ’A PAR - BUR’, ’A MAR - SPA’)
0.00004 0.04265 0.18629 (’F BRE - MAO’, ’A PAR - PIC’, ’A MAR - SPA’)
0.00001 0.09291 0.15828 (’F BRE - ENG’, ’A PAR - BUR’, ’A MAR S A PAR - BUR’)
0.00000 0.04109 0.06872 (’F BRE H’, ’A PAR H’, ’A MAR H’)
GERMANY avg_utility=0.21252
probs bp_p avg_u orders
0.39050 0.01382 0.21360 (’F KIE - DEN’, ’A MUN - TYR’, ’A BER - KIE’)
0.38959 0.02058 0.21381 (’F KIE - DEN’, ’A MUN S A PAR - BUR’, ’A BER - KIE’)
0.16608 0.01628 0.21739 (’F KIE - DEN’, ’A MUN H’, ’A BER - KIE’)
0.04168 0.21879 0.21350 (’F KIE - DEN’, ’A MUN - BUR’, ’A BER - KIE’)
0.01212 0.47409 0.21287 (’F KIE - DEN’, ’A MUN - RUH’, ’A BER - KIE’)
0.00003 0.05393 0.14238 (’F KIE - HOL’, ’A MUN - BUR’, ’A BER - KIE’)
0.00000 0.16896 0.13748 (’F KIE - HOL’, ’A MUN - RUH’, ’A BER - KIE’)
0.00000 0.03355 0.05917 (’F KIE H’, ’A MUN H’, ’A BER H’)
ITALY avg_utility=0.13444
probs bp_p avg_u orders
0.41740 0.19181 0.13609 (’F NAP - ION’, ’A ROM - APU’, ’A VEN S F TRI’)
0.25931 0.07652 0.12465 (’F NAP - ION’, ’A ROM - VEN’, ’A VEN - TRI’)
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0.13084 0.29814 0.12831 (’F NAP - ION’, ’A ROM - VEN’, ’A VEN - TYR’)
0.09769 0.03761 0.13193 (’F NAP - ION’, ’A ROM - APU’, ’A VEN - TRI’)
0.09412 0.16622 0.13539 (’F NAP - ION’, ’A ROM - APU’, ’A VEN H’)
0.00034 0.05575 0.11554 (’F NAP - ION’, ’A ROM - APU’, ’A VEN - PIE’)
0.00028 0.13228 0.10953 (’F NAP - ION’, ’A ROM - VEN’, ’A VEN - PIE’)
0.00000 0.04167 0.05589 (’F NAP H’, ’A ROM H’, ’A VEN H’)
RUSSIA avg_utility=0.06623
probs bp_p avg_u orders
0.64872 0.05988 0.06804 (’F STP/SC - FIN’, ’A MOS - UKR’, ’A WAR - GAL’, ’F SEV - BLA’)
0.28869 0.07200 0.06801 (’F STP/SC - BOT’, ’A MOS - STP’, ’A WAR - UKR’, ’F SEV - BLA’)
0.04914 0.67998 0.05929 (’F STP/SC - BOT’, ’A MOS - UKR’, ’A WAR - GAL’, ’F SEV - BLA’)
0.01133 0.01147 0.05023 (’F STP/SC - BOT’, ’A MOS - SEV’, ’A WAR - UKR’, ’F SEV - RUM’)
0.00120 0.02509 0.05008 (’F STP/SC - BOT’, ’A MOS - UKR’, ’A WAR - GAL’, ’F SEV - RUM’)
0.00064 0.09952 0.05883 (’F STP/SC - BOT’, ’A MOS - STP’, ’A WAR - GAL’, ’F SEV - BLA’)
0.00027 0.01551 0.04404 (’F STP/SC - BOT’, ’A MOS - SEV’, ’A WAR - GAL’, ’F SEV - RUM’)
0.00000 0.03655 0.02290 (’F STP/SC H’, ’A MOS H’, ’A WAR H’, ’F SEV H’)
TURKEY avg_utility=0.13543
probs bp_p avg_u orders
0.82614 0.25313 0.13787 (’F ANK - BLA’, ’A SMY - ARM’, ’A CON - BUL’)
0.14130 0.00651 0.12942 (’F ANK - BLA’, ’A SMY - ANK’, ’A CON - BUL’)
0.03080 0.61732 0.12760 (’F ANK - BLA’, ’A SMY - CON’, ’A CON - BUL’)
0.00074 0.01740 0.11270 (’F ANK - CON’, ’A SMY - ARM’, ’A CON - BUL’)
0.00069 0.05901 0.12192 (’F ANK - CON’, ’A SMY - ANK’, ’A CON - BUL’)
0.00030 0.00750 0.11557 (’F ANK - CON’, ’A SMY H’, ’A CON - BUL’)
0.00001 0.00598 0.10179 (’F ANK S F SEV - BLA’, ’A SMY - CON’, ’A CON - BUL’)
0.00001 0.03314 0.04464 (’F ANK H’, ’A SMY H’, ’A CON H’)
C RL DETAILS
Each action a in the MDP is a sequence of orders (o1, . . . , ot). The probability of the order a under
policy piθ is defined by an LSTM in auto regressive fashion, i.e., piθ(a) =
∏t
i=1(piθ(oi|o1 . . . oi−1)).
To make training more stable, we would like to prevent entropy H(piθ) := −Ea∼piθ log(piθ(a) from
collapsing to zero. The naive way to optimize the entropy of the joint distribution is to use a sum of
entropies for each individual order, i.e., ddθH(piθ(•)) ≈
∑t
i=1
d
dθH(piθ(•|o1 . . . oi−1)). However,
we found that this does not work well for our case probably because there are strong correlations
between orders. Instead we use an unbiased estimate of the joint entropy that is agnostic to the size
of the action space and requires only to be able to sample from a model and to adjust probabilities
of the samples.
Statement 1. Let piθ(•) be a probability distribution over a discrete set A, such that ∀a ∈ A piθ(a)
is a smooth function of a vector of parameters θ. Then
d
dθ
(H(piθ(•))) = −Ea∼piθ (1 + log piθ(a))
d
dθ
log piθ(a).
Proof. Proof is similar to one for REINFORCE:
d
dθ
(H(piθ(•))) = d
dθ
(−Ea∼piθ log piθ(a))
= − d
dθ
(∑
a∈A
piθ(a) log piθ(a)
)
= −
∑
a∈A
(
d
dθ
piθ(a) log piθ(a)
)
= −
∑
a∈A
(
piθ(a)
d
dθ
log piθ(a) + log piθ(a)
d
dθ
piθ(a)
)
= −
∑
a∈A
(
piθ(a)
d
dθ
log piθ(a) + log piθ(a)piθ(a)
d
dθ
log piθ(a)
)
= −
∑
a∈A
piθ(a)
(
(1 + log piθ(a))
d
dθ
log piθ(a)
)
= −Ea∼piθ
(
(1 + log piθ(a))
d
dθ
log piθ(a)
)
.
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D SUBGAME EXPLOITABILITY RESULTS
Figure D plots the total exploitability of joint policies computed by ERM in the subgame used for
equilibrium search at each phase in 7 simulated Diplomacy games.
E COMPARISON WITH DIPNET AGENTS
Table 4 compares our search agent (SearchBot) with the supervised and RL DipNet agents. Follow-
ing prior work, we compute average scores in ‘1v6’ games containing a single agent of type A and
six agents of type B. The average SoS score of an identical agent should therefore be 1/7 ≈ 14.3%.
The SearchBot agent achieves its highest 1v6 SoS score when matched against its own blueprint,
since it is most accurately able to approximate the behavior of that agent. It outperforms all three
agents by a large margin, and none of the three baselines is able to achieve more than 1% SoS score
against our search agent.
Agent A (1x) Agent B (6x) Average SoS Score Games
SearchBot SL DipNet 54.5%± 2% 670
SearchBot RL DipNet 35.6%± 2% 699
SearchBot Blueprint 60.8%± 2% 699
SL DipNet SearchBot 0.2%± 0.2% 138
RL DipNet SearchBot 0.7%± 0.3% 140
Blueprint SearchBot 0.6%± 0.3% 140
Table 4: Comparison of average sum-of-squares scores for our agent (SearchBot) in 1v6 games with DipNet
agents from Paquette et al. (2019), as well as our own blueprint imitation learning agent. All agents other than
SearchBot use a temperature of 0.1.
F DETAILS ON EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Most games on webdiplomacy.net were played with 24-hour turns, though the agent also
played in some “live” games with 5-minute turns. Different hyperparameters were used for live
games versus non-live games. In non-live games, we typically ran ERM for 2,048 iterations with
a rollout length of 3 movement phases, and set Mi equal to 5 times the number of units a player
controls. This typically required about 20 minutes to compute. In live games, including games in
which one human played against six bots, we typically ran ERM for 256 iterations with a rollout
length of 2 movement phases, and set Mi equal to 3.5 times the number of units a player controls.
This typically required about 2 minutes to compute. In all cases, the temperature for the blueprint in
rollouts was set to 0.75.
In some situations in Diplomacy, a player is bound to lose regardless of what action they take. In
these situations, we found that regret matching does a poor job of predicting human moves. In order
to account for this, our search algorithm assumed that any player with a projected sum-of-squares
score of less than 2% would simply play according to the blueprint policy.
The experiments on webdiplomacy.net occurred over a three-month timespan, with games
commonly taking one to two months to complete (players are typically given 24 hours to act).
Freezing research and development over such a period would have been impractical, so our agent
was not fixed for the entire time period. Instead, serious bugs were fixed, improvements to the
algorithm were made, and the model was updated.
In games on webdiplomacy.net, a draw was submitted if SearchBot did not gain a center in
two years, or if the agent’s projected sum-of-squares score was less than the score it would achieve
by an immediate draw. Since there was no way to submit draws through the webdiplomacy.net
API, draws were submitted manually once the above criteria was satisfied.
14
Preprint
Figure 4: Exploitability as a function of ERM iteration at each phase of 7 simulated games with our search
agent (until the game ends or the search agent is eliminated). Aggregate results in Figure 3.
G QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SEARCHBOT
Qualitatively, we observe that SearchBot performs particularly well in the early and mid game.
However, we observe that it sometimes struggles with endgame situations. In particular, when it is
clear that one power will win unless the others work together to stop it, SearchBot will sometimes
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Power Score Human Mean Games Wins Draws Losses
All Games 25.6% ± 4.8% 14.3% 50 7 16 27
Normalized By Power 27.0% ± 5.3% 14.3% 50 7 16 27
Austria 42.4% 11.0% 7 2 2 3
England 29.4% 12.6% 8 1 3 4
France 7.8% 16.9% 9 0 3 6
Germany 41.8% 15.0% 6 1 3 2
Italy 31.7% 11.6% 5 1 2 2
Russia 18.8% 14.8% 8 1 2 5
Turkey 17.1% 18.2% 7 1 1 5
Table 5: Performance of our agent in anonymous games against humans on webdiplomacy.net. Average
human performance is 14.3%. Score in the case of draws was determined by the rules of the joined game. The
± shows one standard error. Due to small sample sizes, we do not display a ± for individual powers. Average
human performance for was calculated based on SoS scoring of historical games on webdiplomacy.net.
Power 1 Human vs. 6 DipNet 1 Human vs. 6 Blueprint 1 Human vs. 6 SearchBot
All Games 39.1% 22.5% 5.7%
Austria 40% 20% 0%
England 28.4% 20% 0%
France 20% 4.3% 40%
Germany 40% 33% 0%
Italy 60% 20% 0%
Russia 40% 20% 0%
Turkey 45.1% 40% 0%
Table 6: Performance of one expert human playing against six bots under repeated play. A score less than
14.3% suggests the human is unable to exploit the bot. Five games were played for each power for each agent,
for a total of 35 games per agent. For each power, the human first played all games against DipNet, then the
blueprint model described in Section 3.1, and then finally SearchBot.
continue to attack its would-be allies. There may be multiple contributing factors to this. One im-
portant limitation, which we have verified in some situations, is that the sampled subgame actions
may not contain any action that could prevent a loss. This is exacerbated by the fact that players
typically control far more units in the endgame and the number of possible actions grows expo-
nentially with the number of units, so the sampled subgame actions contain a smaller fraction of all
possible actions. Another possible contributing factor is that the state space near the end of the game
is far larger, so there is relatively less data for supervised learning in this part of the game. Finally,
another possibility is that because the network only has a dependence on the state of the board and
the most recent player actions, it is unable to sufficiently model the future behavior of other players
in response to being attacked.
Although the sample size is small, the results suggest that SearchBot performed particularly well
with the central powers of Austria, Germany, and Italy. These powers are considered to be the most
difficult to play by humans because they are believed to require an awareness of the interactions
between all players in the game.
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